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Introduction
Mathematical models in ecological systems represent a long-time scrutinized area. In a distributed-parameter version, they are essentially reaction-diffusion systems with righthand sides of certain special type forming the so-called Lotka-Volterra system. Original studies of oscillation in biological or ecological systems (not necessarily in the presence of diffusion) has been started by Lotka [14] and Volterra [28] . Depending on increasing/decreasing behavior, this includes also the predator-prey system. To be more specific we will use the model involving possibly a satiation, as used already e.g. by Freedman [8] , May [15] , or Huang, Lu, Ruan [11] , cf. also [16, Sect.3.3] for an ODE-variant. Let us emphasize that the model with satiation is very realistic because it reflects the universal phenomenon that predators essentially do not hunt prey unless being hungry or being threatened by hunger; humans are an exception but even their feeding capacity is limited. Anyhow, in mathematical literature one can find both models with satiation and simplified models without satiation, cf. e.g. Britton [2] , Murray [16, Sect.12 .2], Pao [19, Sect.12.4] , or also [27, Sect.12.3] or [29, System (4.1)] etc.. For this reason we shall formulate our results to cover also no-satiation case. More general nonlinearities that those we will employ in (1) can also be found, cf. e.g. [13, 29] .
When having modelled such ecological systems, a natural (sometimes unfortunate) ambition of mankind is to control them. This is typically much more difficult than mere modelling. An important phenomenon which can be exploited in various ways is convexity of the cost functional. This is, however, not always guaranteed because the controlled predator/prey ecological system is naturally nonlinear.
In this paper, we investigate this convexity property in a nontrivial context of noncooperative games where it is essential to ensure a mere existence of Nash equilibria. It should be, however, remarked that the results concerning convexity analysis can be directly exploited in conventional optimal control where it induces, e.g., sufficiency of 1st-order optimality conditions or global convergence of optimization routines to globally optimal solutions.
In Section 2, we specify the predator/prey system and derive basic properties we will need further. In Section 3 we specify the noncooperative game, perform the abovementioned convexity analysis, and eventually show existence of its Nash equilibria. Section 4 deals with a conceptual discretization of the game, namely a time discretization of the controlled predator/prey system and spatial discretization of the control variables, and prove some sort of convergence. In Section 5 we introduced the full discretization case and eventually, Section 6 presents an illustrative numerical example.
The controlled state system
We will consider a fixed bounded Lipschitz domain Ω ⊂ IR n where the game between the predator species and the prey takes place, n ≤ 3 (although in most ecological applications n = 2 can be supposed), and T > 0 a finite time horizon. We denote Q := (0, T ) × Ω and Σ := (0, T )×Γ, with Γ := ∂Ω the boundary of Ω. We consider the following predator-prey model: where (·) + denotes the non-negative part and, in fact, is only to avoid formal difficulties in some proofs and is out of any effects for non-negative solutions in which we will be interested so we are definitely authorized to define the right-hand side nonlinearities in a whatever way we need. The unknown functions y = y(t, x) and z = z(t, x) are the densities of the prey and the predator species, while the given functions u = u(x) ≥ 0 and v = v(x) ≥ 0 are the initial densities of them, respectively. The initial settings u and v of the species into the environment area Ω will later be used as controls. The constants in (1) have the following meaning: d 1 , d 2 > 0 are the diffusion coefficient related with migration, a > 0 a growth factor for the prey species, k > 0 the carrying capacity, c > 0 a death rate for the predator in the absence of the prey species, b, d > 0 the interaction rates, (Ω)) . (2) The conventional norms in the space X in question will be denoted by || · || X , but instead of || · || L p (Ω) we will write shortly || · || p .
To be more specific, it holds
Proof. Existence of a weak solution (y, z) to (1) can be proved, e.g., by a constructive way by making a semi-explicit semi-discretization in time and a limit passage, as done in Sect. 4 below. Let us now investigate its qualitative properties we will need later. Now we prove that each weak solution (not only those obtained as a limit mentioned above) is non-negative. Indeed, by testing (1a) by y Now, by testing (1a) by (y − k)
from which we get ||(y − k) + || 2 ≤ 0 by Gronwall's inequality because ||(u − k) + || 2 = 0 and the integral in the left-hand side of (5) is non-negative. Hence y ≤ k a.e. in Q. Note that the L ∞ -bound, namely 0 ≤ y ≤ k, is independent of z and that it holds for any weak solution, not only that one obtained as a limit in Sect. 4 . Now we will prove z(t, x) ≥ 0 a.e. on Ω by testing (1b) by z − . This gives:
note that we used 0 ≤ y ≤ k which has been already proved. From (6) we get ||z
By a substitution Z = e −λt z, the equation in (1b) transforms to
Again note that (8) holds for any weak solution, not only that one obtained as a limit in Sect. 4 .
To prove uniqueness of the solution to (1), we consider two weak solutions (y 1 , z 1 ) and (y 2 , z 2 ) to the initial-boundary-value problem (1), subtract the corresponding equations and test them by y 1 − y 2 and z 1 − z 2 , respectively. This gives 
The game
We will consider a two-player noncooperative game with the predator-prey system (1). Each player is to control an initial condition in one of the equations (1a,b), having his/her own goals expressed by the desired response as well as the cost of the species controlled by this player. Let us agree that the 1st player will control the initial condition for the prey while the 2nd player will control the predator and u max ≥ 0, v max ≥ 0 will denote the maximal allowed density of the initial setting of the prey and the predator, respectively; the dependence of u max and u min on x may reflect territorial authorization for particular players. Our game will have the form:
where (y, z, u, v) satisfies (1) in the weak sense,
-player strategy constraints)
where
Remark 3.1. The functionals J 1 and J 2 chosen correspond to stabilization problems (see, for instance, [10] for other numerical examples of stabilization type problems). Other type of problems that could have been considered are controllability type problems (see, for instance, [5] , [6] and [7] )) when we want to minimize the distance of our state solution at the final time to a target state.
We remind (see Proposition 2.1) that y, z ∈ W
. We are supposing either r = 1 or r = 2, so that the respective terms in J 1 and J 2 represent a cost of the the species to be initially "bought" or the usual L 2 -norm as conventionally used in mathematical setting, respectively. The notation H α (Ω) refers to the usual Sobolev-Slobodetskiȋ space normed by
in comparison with the conventional setting, we multiply the double-integral term in (12) by α, which yields automatically || · || H α (Ω) = || · || 2 if α = 0. The functions
> 0, (13) are desired profiles of the prey and the predator species from the viewpoint of the -th player. For α = 0, the payoffs J 1 and J 2 involve the conventional L 2 (Q)-distance from these desired profiles, while for α > 0 we take into account also some spatially nonlocal interactions; let us point out that one can still admit sharp spatial interfaces in y ,d and z ,d satisfying (13) if α < 1/4. We will employ this α advantageously to compensate nonlinearity of the controlled system.
As standard, a Nash equilibrium (u * , v * ) is understood to satisfy
where we denote
with y = y(u, v) and z = z(u, v) solving (1).
6
Usual arguments leading to existence of Nash equilibria always need convexity of the payoff functionals Φ 1 (·, v) and Φ 2 (u, ·). This convexity is, however, not automatic because the controlled system is nonlinear, but it may really hold if this nonlinearity is not dominant (i.e. if a, b and d are small enough) and is compensated by uniform continuity of the pay-offs.
We will prove this convexity by a second-order analysis of the payoffs. This technique was essentially exposed in [9] to establish sufficiency of first-order optimality conditions; see also [26] or, in the context of noncooperative games, also [24, 25] . Let us introduce the Lagrange function for the -th player:
The adjoint system for the -th player is [L ] (y,z) (y, z, u, v, p, q) = 0. Let us denote its solutions by p = p and q = q . Hence, in the classical formulation, p and q are to solve the following system of linear parabolic equations with boundary and terminal conditions:
where the linear operator D
We have an explicit formula for the operator of the "fractional derivative", namely
cf. [1, Formula (2.14)]. Then, by the standard adjoint-equation technique, we have the formula for the Gâteaux differential of the payoffs:
with (y, z) being the response on (u, v) in question and (p , q ) solves (17) . The important fact is that the controlled system (1), hence implicitly also each payoff Φ , involves nonlinearities which are nonsmooth in the arguments y and z at zero. Hence the formula (18) holds if y, z > 0 while in the opposite case it should be understood only to yield a formula for a relevant directional derivative, but this is just what plays role. This is also why we allow to simplify the Lagrangean (16) 
Sketch of the proof. The existence of p h and q h can be proved by standards arguments, based on the a-priori estimate obtained by testing (17a) and (17b) (in some approximate variant, e.g., the Galerkin modification) by ∂ ∂t p and ∂ ∂t q , respectively, and then making a limit passage. The mentioned test gives ∂p ∂t
with C a constant depending on ||y|| ∞ and ||z|| ∞ , from which we get by Young's and Gronwall's inequalities the bounds of p and q in L
(Ω)) with some positive, hence also
(Ω) can be seen simply from the estimate
where we used Hölder's inequality and the fact that Ω |x − ξ|
The uniqueness can be easily proved in a way similar to that of the uniqueness of solution of (y, z) proved in Proposition 2.1 (the proof is even simpler because of the linearity of system (17)).
2 8 The convexity analysis of Φ is based on the 2nd-order differential of the Lagrange function, for which we have obviously the following formulae:
where (y, z, p , q ) is the response to (u, v) and ( y, z) is the response to ( u, v), and ( y, z, p , q ) corresponds to ( u, v).
Proof. By using the state equation (1), the adjoint equation (17), and by-part integration in time, we can see (cf. [24, Lemma 2.3] ) that the left-hand side of (21) equals to
where D denotes the remainder in the Taylor-expansion formula up to the 1st order term, i.e.
and F and G are the right-hand sides of (1a) and (1b), respectively, considered with (·)
Hence by a simple algebra
) and similar estimates hold for |D F ( y, z, y, z)|, where the supreme can be taken over all ( y, z) that can occur for controls ranging over U × V which, in view of (3) with (11), motivated the choice of "inf" in (21) .
2 Remark 3.5. (Increment formula.) For the satiation rate e = 0 and for the considered exponents r = 1 or r = 2, the optimization system is bi-quadratic (i.e. has quadratic payoff as well as quadratic nonlinearities in the controlled system) and then L (·, ·, ·, ·, p , q ) is constant and we have a simple identity:
see [26, Lemma 8] . 
, satisfying (13) and being sufficiently small in the norms of L
so that by the Gronwall inequality we get ||y|| L ∞ (0,T ;L 2 (Ω)) ≤ √ e 2aT ||u|| 2 and then again from (26) we get
which shows that ||y|| L 2 (0,T ;H 1 0 (Ω)) must be small if ||u|| 2 (which is bounded by |Ω|||u|| ∞ ) is small. Similarly, testing (1b) by z, one gets
so that by the Gronwall inequality one gets ||z|| L ∞ (0,T ;L 2 (Ω)) ≤ √ e 2γT ||v|| 2 with γ := (dk − c) + and then again from (27) we get
which shows that ||z|| L 2 (0,T ;H 1 0 (Ω)) must be small if ||v|| 2 (which is bounded by |Ω|||v|| ∞ ) is small. By the proof of Lemma 3. cf. (19) . In particular, we can assume the mentioned data qualification so strict that
is satisfied with C a constant from the estimate
The estimate (29) holds due to the Hölder inequality with Sobolev embeddings provided α is sufficiently large, which here means (25) . Note that, in case n = 3,
(Ω) so that 6
= 1, which explains the last bound in (25) . Then, in view of (20), by using the Young inequality and (28), we can estimate:
is convex, we can join (18) and (24) to obtain
Replacing the role of ( u, v) and (u, v), we get also
Summing (31) and (32)
As u, u ∈ U and v, v ∈ V are arbitrary, we have thus proved monotonicity of Φ on U × V. From this, convexity of Φ follows by a standard argument. 2
Existence of Nash equilibria [17] by the standard technique developed by Nikaidô and Isoda [18] would require the payoffs (separately) continuous with respect to compact topologies on U and V, which is not compatible with usual norm or weak topologies on these sets if r = 1. Alternatively, we could make a relaxation by means of Young measures, prove existence in terms of mixed strategies, and then to show from the maximum principle that each Nash equilibrium must be, in fact, composed from pure strategies (ranging over the original sets U and V), cf. [23, Chapter 7] for this approach. We, however, choose even a simpler technique based on the Schauder-type fixed-point theorem, which is even slightly more constructive than [18] where, beside the Schauder theorem, also a non-constructive selection by compactness argument and a contradiction argument are used. Proof. Any fixed point on U × V of the set-valued mapping
where Argmin U Φ 1 (·, v) := {u ∈ U; Φ 1 (u, v) = min Φ 1 (U, v)} and Argmin V Φ 2 (u, ·) being defined analogously, is obviously a Nash equilibrium.
We will prove existence of such fixed point by Schauder-type theorem. As the inequalities in (28) are not strict, we do not have strict convexity of the payoffs, hence (33) can indeed be a set-valued mapping in general, and we are to use Kakutani's generalization of Schauder's theorem, which needs U × V to be convex and compact, and the mapping (33) to be upper semicontinuous with closed convex values. These requirements are valid if a weak*-L ∞ (Ω) topology is taken on both U and V. Indeed, the convexity of Argmin U Φ 1 (·, v) follows from the convexity of U and of Φ 1 (·, v) proved in Proposition 3.6. Furthermore, this topology makes Φ 1 (·, v) lower semicontinuous and Φ 1 (u, ·) is even continuous because u does not occur explicitly in Φ 1 , cf. (10) . To show the upper semicontinuity of the set-valued mapping v → Argmin U Φ 1 (·, v), let us take a sequence {v k } converging weakly to v and a sequence {u k } weakly convergent to u and
for all u ∈ U . Making a limit passage, by lower semicontinuity of Φ and upper semicontinuity of Φ ( u, ·), we get
which says that u ∈ Argmin U Φ 1 (·, v) . Hence, the upper semicontinuity of the mapping
Conceptual approximation scheme
To implement the above game computationally, one needs to discretize the controlled system (1). This can be made by various ways, but one option is of a special interest: a suitable semi-explicit formula in time which would guarantee all previous estimates (i.e. stability and non-negativity of approximate solutions) and simultaneously would yield linear problems at each time level so that it allows for exact solutions to the discretized system. This is important especially in context of optimization where usage of iterative solvers would lead to inaccuracy also in the calculated gradient of Φ (i.e. in solution to the corresponding discrete adjoint problem) which would eventually make troubles in optimization routines which are usually very sensitive to any inaccuracy in the calculated gradient. To demonstrate the main features in an easy-to-observe way, we present only a conceptual discretization in time, keeping the spatial variable x continuous; this semidiscretization in time is sometimes called Rothe's method if made in a fully implicit way (which is not our case, however).
We consider the time discretization step τ , defined by τ = T /N , where N is a positive integer. Besides, we take some finite-dimensional subsets U h ⊂ U and V h ⊂ V where h > 0 is a discretization parameter, assuming naturally that these sets are nested for h 0 and
(Ω)-dense in U and V, respectively. Moreover, we assume these sets to be weakly closed; an example is a discretization of both U and V with piecewise constant controls on a finite-volume discretization of Ω. We approximate then the Nash Equilibrium problem (10) by the following semi-discretized problem:
Find a Nash Equilibrium of
in Ω, To do it, we write (37a) in the following equivalent way:
Then, testing by (y 
Then, testing by (z
Let us see that we can choose M such that 1 τ
which is equivalent to
Now, a necessary condition for (45) is
which is true by hypothesis. Then, (45) is equivalent to
Under these conditions, we have 0 ≤ z 
Proof of Lemma 4.3. Since 0 ≤ y
Then, multiplying it by τ and summing for i = 1, ..., N , we obtain 
2 . Then, multiplying by τ and summing for i = 1, ..., N , we obtain
Then, from (39), we have that
Finally, from (42), we have that
For further purposes, we need also to involve a continuous dependence on the initial conditions. This is, however, just a simple extension of the convergence proof. Proof. There is a "technical" difficulty that , and also 
is obviously bounded and 
for some C, we obtain
(Ω)). Now we are to prove that (y, z) solves (1). In terms of the introduced functions y τ,h ,
, the scheme (37) can be written down in a "compact" form as
on Ω. (51d) 17 We already know that (ȳ τ,h ,z τ,h ) → (y, z) strongly in L 2 (Q). Like (48), we have also (47); note that the last estimate can not hold in L
This allows us already to make limit passage in (51). Note that the nonlinearity IR (Ω) is (weak,weak)-continuous which allows to pass to the limit in the initial conditions (51d).
Due to uniqueness of the weak solution to (1), the whole sequence
2
We could now do the analysis of convexity analogous to Proposition 3.6 for the discrete game (36). This would incorporate only a lot of work but not new ideas. Therefore, we will rather base further considerations only on convexity of the continuous problem. To do that, the continuous game (10) can be exploited in some extent. Let us still introduce
,τ is defined analogously, and
where (ȳ τ ,z τ ) = (ȳ τ ,z τ )(u, v) is the solution to (37) and where J 1,τ and J 2,τ is just as J 1 and J 2 but with y ,d,τ and z ,d,τ instead of y ,d and z ,d , respectively, i.e.
We point out that these functionals are the same as those defined in (36).
For a tolerance ε > 0 we say that a couple (u * , v * ) is an ε-solution of the approximate game if
Obviously, existence of such an ε-solution is trivial if ε is sufficiently large but then the relevance with the original game is rather lost. Hence, it is important to have a chance to push ε to zero: Moreover, any sequence of such ε-solutions obtained by pushing (τ, h, ε) 
We proved before that the functionals Φ 
, and similar estimate holds for Φ 2 , too.
Let 
Thus, in particular, considering (u, v) ∈ U h × V h only, we can see that (u h , v h ) is an ε-solution to the approximate game (56) for
Furthermore, let us take (u (u, v) ∈ U h × V h . Passing to the limit with (τ, h, ε) → 0, having in mind a subsequence satisfying (57) we obtain 
We point out that here the integrals are denoting the duality pair ·, · are, in fact, irrelevant because of (60).
Remark 4.6. We point out that the above system of equations is a time discretization of the adjoint system (17) . Furthermore, if we know {y
, at each step we have to solve two uncoupled elliptic problems.
By the standard adjoint-equation technique, we have the formula for the Gâteaux differential of the payoffs:
being the response on (u, v) and (p , q ) solving the above system.
Full discretization
Still a spatial discretization of the recursive elliptic boundary-value problems (37) has to be done. For this, we use the finite-element method with piecewise affine base functions. We do not perform the (lengthy and technical) analysis of the corresponding fully discrete case, mentioning only that Proposition 4.5 can be extended for this case, too.
We have to solve the following system of linear algebraic equations: We approximate then the Nash Equilibrium problem (36) by the following fully discretized problem (we consider here the case α = 0):
solve (63) ). For the fully discretized problem, the Lagrange function for the -th player is the function
The 
note that the undefined values of y
are, in fact, irrelevant because of (66).
Remark 5.1. We point out that the above system of equations is a space discretization of the adjoint time discretized system 60-61 and therefore, a full discretization of the adjoint system (17) . Furthermore, if we know {y
, at each step we have to solve two uncoupled algebraic problems.
By the standard adjoint-equation technique, we have the formula for the differential of the payoffs: Therefore the players 1 and 2 want the response to be close to y s and z s , respectively, taking also into account the cost of the implementation of their controls (in this case the cost of the preys is much more expensive than that of the predators).
Verification of the assumptions of Proposition 3.6 is however very difficult, and we do not know whether the above data satisfy them, and henceforth we will proceed rather "blindly".
6.2. Nash equilibrium search algorithm. The existence of a constructive method to solve the corresponding finite-dimensional game remains, to the best of our knowledge, an open problem for general cases. In [21] a converging conjugate-gradient type algorithm has been used for linear partial differential equations. For nonlinear systems with suitable convex properties of the functionals involved (as those showed above) an iterative procedure has been developed in [12] , but it requires the minimization of a non-convex function over compact domains, which is not well-suited for an implementation on the computer.
Anyhow, we propose the following conceptual algorithm to compute an approximate solution of the Nash equilibrium problem:
Step 1. (u 0 , v 0 ) is given in U h × V h , k := 0.
Step 2. Find u k+1 ∈ Argmin U h Φ 1,τ (·, v k ).
Step 3. Find v k+1 ∈ Argmin V h Φ 2,τ (u k+1 , ·).
Step 4. If
≤ factr * eps
≤ factr * eps then stop else do k := k + 1 and go to Step 2. After the stop, (u k+1 , v k+1 ) is to be considered as an approximate Nash equilibrium. In
Step 4, eps and factr denote the machine precision of the computer and a control factor for the stopping criteria, respectively. The value of eps can be taken directly from the computer (typically eps≈ 10
−16
). Typical values for factr are: 10 12 for low accuracy, 10 7 for moderate accuracy and 10 for extremely high accuracy. In all our numerical tests we have used a personal computer with eps≈ 2.2204 10
and a control factor factr= 10 7 . We point out that u 0 is seemingly unimportant but it is implicitly to be used as a starting iteration for the iterative procedure solving the minimization problem in Step 2 for k = 0. Moreover, we point out that there is no proof of stopping of the above iterative procedure for a finite k (we can even show a counterexample) even if some Nash equilibrium does exist, but it follows a natural way which real systems are tempted for reaching an equilibrium (although it does not always lead to it). That is why we expect our algorithm to be convergent at least in "naturally qualified" situations. This procedure has already been used (in a very similar form) in [22] and [20] for a pointwise control of the Burgers equation.
To compute numerically a Nash equilibrium we have used the time discretization scheme showed above, with N = 300, we have fully discretized the problem by using a Finite Element Method, with linear finite elements of size h = 1/50 and we have used the above proposed algorithm with factr= 10
7
. Of course, the minimization of Φ 1,τ (·, v) and of Φ 2,τ (u, ·) can be solved only approximately because these functionals are not quadratic unless a trivial non-interesting case a = b = d = 0. Here we use a subspace trust region method, which is based on the interior-reflective Newton method described in [3] , [4] . Table 1 shows the value of the payoff functionals at each iteration. 
